1538.5 Motion to Suppress and the Harvey-Madden-Remer Doctrine
A defendant may file a Penal Code 1538.5 motion to suppress both tangible evidence and observations made as a result of an illegal search. Whatever evidence is obtained indirectly due to an unlawful search can be suppressed if it can be shown that the secondary evidence was tainted by the initial illegal search. This is commonly known as the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. There must be a causal connection between the illegal search and the evidence indirectly obtained from the initial illegal search. Penal Code 1538.5 provides a comprehensive method to determine the legality of seized evidence prior to trial.
If a search was conducted with a warrant, a 1538.5 motion must be more specific in the moving papers regarding objections to the search, such as violation of the Harvey-Madden-Remer rule. This corollary of case law based on People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516, Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, and People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017, is known as the ‘Harvey-Remers-Madden’ rule. A prosecutor must establish the source or reliability of the “other officer’s” information when law enforcement officers rely solely on information obtained from another police officer as the basis for a search or arrest. (Remers v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at 667.) “To hold otherwise would permit the manufacture of reasonable grounds for arrest within a police department by one officer transmitting information purportedly known by him to another officer who did not know such information, without establishing under oath how the information had in fact been obtained by the former officer.” (Id. at 666-667.)
Unless the source of the first officer’s information is established, that information is the equivalent of an anonymous tip. In order to support a lawful detention, an anonymous tip must be corroborated sufficiently to provide reasonable suspicion to detain, or probable cause to arrest.
Prior to the Harvey-Madden rule, information was presumed reliable so long as it was from one police department to another. After Madden, the Supreme Court outlawed the idea that an officer can simply refer to information obtained through “official channels” to justify a warrantless search without any further showing as to the basis of that information.
More recently in 2015, in People v. Brown, 61 Cal.4th 968, the court explained that an officer may arrest or detain an individual based on information received through official channels but once a defendant objects as to the basis of this information in a 1538.5 motion, the prosecutor must prove that the source of this information is something other than the imagination of the non-witness officer. The source must be a sufficient indicia of reliability.
Whereas the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy to safeguard the Fourth Amendment, ‘Harvey-Madden’ is a set of state law evidentiary rules setting forth the procedure whereby the prosecution may establish grounds for a questionable search. The set of rules will always trigger the hearsay problem in the context of a motion to suppress because an officer relies on information provided by someone else to establish a reasonable basis for a stop or search. In effect, the ‘Harvey/Madden’ rule simply prevents the prosecution from terms of specificity and facts.
If a search was conducted with a warrant, a 1538.5 motion must be more specific in the moving papers regarding objections to the search, such as violation of the Harvey-Madden-Remer rule. This corollary of case law based on People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516, Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, and People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017, is known as the ‘Harvey-Remers-Madden’ rule. A prosecutor must establish the source or reliability of the “other officer’s” information when law enforcement officers rely solely on information obtained from another police officer as the basis for a search or arrest. (Remers v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at 667.) “To hold otherwise would permit the manufacture of reasonable grounds for arrest within a police department by one officer transmitting information purportedly known by him to another officer who did not know such information, without establishing under oath how the information had in fact been obtained by the former officer.” (Id. at 666-667.)
Unless the source of the first officer’s information is established, that information is the equivalent of an anonymous tip. In order to support a lawful detention, an anonymous tip must be corroborated sufficiently to provide reasonable suspicion to detain, or probable cause to arrest.
Prior to the Harvey-Madden rule, information was presumed reliable so long as it was from one police department to another. After Madden, the Supreme Court outlawed the idea that an officer can simply refer to information obtained through “official channels” to justify a warrantless search without any further showing as to the basis of that information.
More recently in 2015, in People v. Brown, 61 Cal.4th 968, the court explained that an officer may arrest or detain an individual based on information received through official channels but once a defendant objects as to the basis of this information in a 1538.5 motion, the prosecutor must prove that the source of this information is something other than the imagination of the non-witness officer. The source must be a sufficient indicia of reliability.
Whereas the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy to safeguard the Fourth Amendment, ‘Harvey-Madden’ is a set of state law evidentiary rules setting forth the procedure whereby the prosecution may establish grounds for a questionable search. The set of rules will always trigger the hearsay problem in the context of a motion to suppress because an officer relies on information provided by someone else to establish a reasonable basis for a stop or search. In effect, the ‘Harvey/Madden’ rule simply prevents the prosecution from terms of specificity and facts.